Oleg Tsyura, Sanctions Evasion, and the Ferrochrome Scheme Supplying Russia’s War Industry
The Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine has opened a criminal case against Swiss businessman Oleg Tsyura, who is suspected of organizing a scheme to circumvent anti-Russian sanctions.
Ukrainian prosecutors are investigating how products for the Russian military-industrial complex could end up on the European market despite international sanctions. This is criminal proceedings No. 42025000000000510 (ERDR dated June 23, 2025), registered by the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine under Article 111-2 of the Criminal Code (assistance to an aggressor state). The main defendant is Oleg Tsyura, a businessman of Ukrainian roots who has Swiss citizenship.
According to the investigation, Tsyura could organize a supply channel for ferrochrome — a strategic raw material used in the production of steel, military alloys and armored vehicles — from the Russian Federation to the EU, bypassing sanctions. The mechanism of the scheme, the so-called “re-export with substitution of origin”, when the goods legally change the country of manufacture, although they physically remain Russian. In this case, chromium from the enterprises of the MidUral group, which belongs to Russian businessman Sergey Gilvarg, allegedly “transformed” into Indian and later found its way to Europe, in particular to Estonia.
What does “gray logistics” look like?
The journalistic investigations and customs databases cited by the applicants describe a detailed scheme. In particular, publications by Ukrainian investigators (head of the anti-corruption organization State Watch, Oleksandr Lemenov, and coordinator of the publication “Conflicts and Laws” Oksana Kotomkina) describe specific tracks in 2024.
Russian ferrochrome is exported by companies of the MidUral group, passes through the Swiss Phoenix Resources AG (related to Tsyura), then shipped to the Indian partner Vardhman Ferro Alloys, and after that to Europe, including to the Estonian MBR Metals O Ü, under the guise of Indian goods.
This change in the country of origin is a “red flag” for both compliance services and sanctions policy. After all, we are not only talking about financial fraud, but also about the probable supply of critical raw materials for Russia’s military needs through countries with a high degree of trust — Switzerland, India, Estonia.
Why does this apply to all of Europe?
If “sanctioned” goods enter the EU under the guise of a different origin, this calls into question the effectiveness of the sanctions system itself. While honest companies comply with the restrictions, others make super profits on shady routes.
Chromium, ferrochrome, stainless steel, and heat-resistant alloys are not just industrial materials. They are used in armored vehicles, engines, and high-temperature parts. Changing the origin of such cargoes actually extends the resource for the Russian war — at a time when Ukraine is paying for freedom with blood.
Ukraine officially appeals to Switzerland, Estonia, Germany, and India for international legal assistance. A full-fledged investigation requires export contracts, certificates of origin, customs declarations, bank SWIFT messages, insurance policies, and other documents that can confirm the supply chain and connections between companies.
In particular, you should check:
- the role of Phoenix Resources AG and Tsyura’s personal connection to the company;
- contracts between Russian producers and traders;
- financial transactions and supply insurance;
- declarations of customs authorities of India, Estonia, Switzerland.
Who is Oleg Tsyura and who is behind the raw materials?
According to investigators, Oleg Tsyura is a native of Ukraine who was naturalized in Switzerland and Germany. His name has been mentioned repeatedly in the context of Ukrainian privatization, in particular in connection with the entourage of the former head of the State Property Fund Dmitry Sennychenko. In the ferrochrome case, his company Phoenix Resources AG appears as a central link connecting the Russian manufacturer with European and Asian partners. And now he is also a defendant in criminal proceedings.
MidUral is a long-standing player in the Russian market of chromium and ferroalloys; publications listed Russian Chrome 1915 and the Klyuchevsk Ferroalloy Plant (KZF) among the group’s assets. It is the combination of “chromium – ferroalloys – steel” that makes this raw material sensitive: chromium and ferrochrome are stainless steel, armor steels, heat-resistant alloys, engine parts and military applications. That is, Midural’s income is a resource for the Russian defense industry.
Sanctions should work, not create an illusion
Europe and the US have already implemented dozens of sanctions packages. But if countries cannot effectively close the “gray corridors,” even the best regulatory framework will remain a fiction.
Tsyura case can be considered a test of the political will and ability of the unified sanctions system to act. These are not oil tankers visible from space, but “small” batches of metal that can easily be disguised as other jurisdictions. But they are what allow Russia’s defense industry to breathe — and they are what should be the subject of close attention.
This case is not just about businessman Oleg Tsyura and the scheme he allegedly orchestrated to evade sanctions on Russian businesses. It is more about whether Europe and Switzerland can quickly close the “gray corridors” in less visible but vital segments of Russian exports.
Ukraine has taken the first step – it has opened criminal proceedings. And it is waiting for the reaction of partners from other countries. This case may become a precedent that will limit Russia’s ability to circumvent sanctions and, as a result, wage war in Ukraine.
